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Abstract 
 
 
 A fundamental property of a progressive income tax is that it provides implicit insurance 
against shocks to income by dampening the variability of disposable income and consumption. 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) in combination with the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (TRA86) greatly reduced the number of marginal tax brackets and the maximum marginal 
rate, which limits the stabilizing effect of the tax system on household consumption when pre-tax 
income fluctuates. We examine the effect of the federal income tax reforms of the 1980s on the 
associated degree of automatic stabilization of consumption. The empirical framework derives 
from the consumption insurance literature, where the ideal outcome is spatially equal changes in 
households’ marginal utilities of consumption, and permits partial insurance, which we use to 
identify how the degree of consumption insurance has changed since ERTA and TRA86.  Our 
data come from interview years 1980–1991 in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find 
that in certain cases the tax reforms of the 1980s actually increased the automatic stabilization 
inherent in the United States income tax. Overall, ERTA and TRA86 reduced consumption 
stability by about 50 percent. More recent tax reforms, most notably increased EITC generosity, 
have restored or enhanced consumption insurance. A welfare analysis indicates that the cost of 
moving to the post-TRA86 system is sizable for relatively risk averse households facing large 
income risk, but is much more modest for the typical household.  
Introduction 
 
One of the most important economic events of the 1980s was the comprehensive 
overhaul of the United States federal income tax system. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 (ERTA) reduced marginal tax rates an average of 23 percent within each bracket. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) broadened the tax base and reduced the number of tax brackets 
from 16 to four. The marginal tax rate on highest income earners dropped from 70 percent in 
1981 to 50 percent in 1982 and dropped further to 28 percent in 1988. In 1980 over 75 percent of 
taxpayers faced statutory tax rates above 15 percent; by 1995 fewer than 25 percent faced rates 
above 15 percent (Burman et al. 1998). Overall, the tax reforms in the 1980s reduced the average 
tax burden by 25 percent. Many economists have examined how tax reform influenced incentives 
to work (Blundell et al. 1998; Bosworth and Burtless 1992; Eissa 1996;, Kniesner and Ziliak 
1998; Ziliak and Kniesner 1999), to save (Bernheim 1999; Bosworth and Burtless 1992; Engen 
and Gale 1996), and to invest (Auerbach 1996; Auerbach and Slemrod 1997). Conspicuously 
absent is research on how the tax reforms of the 1980s offset a beneficial dimension of 
progressive taxation, automatic stabilization of expenditures. We examine empirically how the 
reforms to the federal income tax in the United States during the 1980s reduced the automatic 
smoothing of household consumption after a shock to income.  
 The paucity of empirical research on automatic stabilization is somewhat surprising 
because of the parallel literature on the consumption smoothing benefits of social insurance 
programs (Hamermesh 1982; Gruber 1996, 1997; Dynarski and Gruber 1997) and because a key 
aspect of a progressive income tax is providing collective insurance against idiosyncratic shocks 
to income in turn smoothing consumption and dampening the business cycle. For example, 
consumption falls by less than a negative shock to taxable income because the household’s tax  
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burden is reduced, possibly because it falls into a lower marginal tax bracket. ERTA and TRA86 
lowered tax rates and established fewer and wider marginal tax brackets, which diminishes the 
likelihood of falling into a lower tax bracket after a negative shock to income and limits 
households’ ability to maintain consumption compared to a more progressive tax. Contrary to the 
welfare-enhancing effects of the flattening of the income tax during the 1980s operating through 
the labor-supply substitution effect (Hausman 1981; Kniesner and Ziliak 1998), a weakened 
automatic stabilizer is welfare-reducing because households have greater variability of 
disposable incomes (Varian 1980). 
 There is substantial empirical research on how actions within families (Hayashi, Altonji, 
and Kotlikoff 1996) and between families (Altug and Miller 1990; Attanasio and Davis 1996; 
Banks et al. 1997; Cochrane 1991; Deaton 1997; Gertler and Gruber 1997; Ham and Jacobs 
2000; Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 1996; Mace 1991; Nelson 1994; and Townsend 1994) can 
stabilize consumption. Recent research on implicit consumption insurance uses a theoretical 
framework in which a hypothetical central planner allocates resources across households to 
equate the growth rates of the marginal utilities of consumption. The strong testable implication 
of complete consumption insurance is that after accounting for changes in aggregate resources 
the growth of an individual household’s consumption should not depend on changes in the 
household’s own economic resources. With few exceptions (Altug and Miller 1990; Mace 1991), 
empirical research rejects complete implicit consumption insurance. 
An income tax produces partial implicit consumption insurance for households when 
income changes, whether the change is anticipated or unanticipated. There is little research on 
partial implicit consumption insurance; most of it focuses on developing countries (Deaton 1997; 
Gertler and Gruber 1997), and little of it considers recent United States tax reforms (Auerbach 
and Feenberg 2000; Cohen and Follette 1999). 
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 We specify a model of the evolution of consumption where the focus is on identifying the 
degree to which partial consumption insurance has changed because of ERTA and TRA86. To 
track time variation in partial risk sharing we use panel data and the Keane and Runkle (1992) 
forward-filter estimators of Euler equations with latent heterogeneity. Our data are from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for interview years 1980–1991, which encompasses the 
periods before ERTA and after TRA86. Food consumption is the measure examined most often 
by researchers using the PSID to test complete consumption insurance (Altug and Miller 1990; 
Cochrane 1991; Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 1996; and Ham and Jacobs 2000). Because the 
Food Stamp Program will stabilize food consumption it is plausible that the tax reforms of the 
1980s did little to food consumption. We therefore focus primarily on total consumption 
constructed as a residual of income net of taxes and saving (Ziliak 1998). 
 We find that across the 1980s the progressive income tax stabilized household 
consumption by 15 percent in response to a given reduction in gross income. On balance, though, 
the tax reforms of the 1980s cut in half the consumption stabilizing effect of the United States 
income tax. Welfare simulations indicate that the average household would have to be 
compensated annually with an additional 2.5 percent of baseline consumption to move from a 
pre-ERTA tax system to an equal-yield annual lump-sum tax, compared to compensation of 1.4 
percent to move from a post-TRA86 system to an equal-yield annual lump-sum tax. Moreover, 
the cost of moving to the post-TRA86 system is upwards of 6 percent for relatively risk averse 
households facing large income risk, but is much more modest for the typical household. Our 
results highlight an under-appreciated benefit of a progressive tax system and how that benefit 
was reduced by the 1980s tax reforms. There are some exceptions. Changes in Social Security 
taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit during the 1980s and 1990s increasingly stabilized 
consumption for low-income couples and single mothers in the upper half of the income 
distribution.  
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Conceptual Framework 
 
 The theory of complete consumption insurance begins with a social planner who, given 
household-specific social weights, µh, allocates resources under uncertainty across households 
and over time to equalize the growth rates of the marginal utilities of consumption. 
Algebraically, the planner’s problem is to maximize the weighted sum of households’ utilities 
 
1 1 1
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µ ρ π δ∑ ∑∑  (1) 
where h indexes households, t indexes time, s indexes economic state, ρh is the household’s rate 
of time preference, πst is the probability of state s in time t, hstc  is the household’s consumption in 
state s and time t, and hstδ  indexes shocks to preferences across households and over time. The 
adding up constraint in the maximization problem posed is 
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such that the sum of households’ consumption expenditures is aggregate consumption in state s 
at time t. 
 The choice variable is household consumption, hstc , and the first-order conditions for 
maximizing (1) subject to (2) given the realization of state s are 
 ( ) ( , )h t h h ht c t t tU cρ µ π δ = λ , (3) 
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resources constraint, and Uc is the 
marginal utility of consumption. 
Taking the natural log of (3), first differencing to eliminate the fixed household social 
weight µh, and rearranging yields the Euler equation 
 ln ( , ) ln ln lnh h hc t t t tU c∆ δ = ∆ λ − ∆ π − ρ . (4) 
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Equation (4) describes the main implication of complete consumption insurance. The discounted 
growth in the marginal utility of consumption is constant across households; given aggregate 
resources, changes in an individual household’s resources do not affect how its marginal utility 
of consumption evolves. 
 To operationalize (4) we need to specify a functional form for within-period utility. We 
use the isoelastic utility function suggested by Deaton (1997) 
 1 (1 )( , ) ( , , ) (1 ) ( / )h h h h h h h ht t t t t t t tU c U c n c n
− −σδ ≡ θ σ = − σ θ , (5) 
where htθ  is a multiplicative taste shifter capturing time variation in the household’s preferences, 
σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, htn  is the size of household h at time t, and /
h h
t tc n  is 
per capita consumption.1  Given isoelastic preferences and defining *ln ln lnt t t∆ λ ≡ ∆ λ − ∆ π , 
equation (4) becomes 
 1 * 1 *ln( / ) ( ln ln ln ) ( ln )h h h h ht t t t t tc n
− −∆ = − σ ∆ λ − ∆ θ − ρ = − σ ∆ λ −∆ε . (6) 
With preference shocks that are mean zero stochastic disturbances the discounted growth of per 
capita consumption will be the same for all households. 
 Equation (6) is the mode specification in the empirical literature on consumption 
insurance. The substantial amount of research emerging over the past decade tests the complete 
insurance hypothesis with data from both developing countries (Deaton 1997; Gertler and Gruber 
1997; Morduch 1995; Townsend 1994) and developed countries (Altug and Miller 1990; 
Attanasio and Davis 1996; Banks et al. 1997; Cochrane 1991; Hayashi et al. 1996; Mace 1991; 
Nelson 1994). The predominant finding is that complete implicit consumption insurance is not 
typical either between or within families. 
Rejection of complete insurance is probably not surprising given the moral hazard 
problems inherent in devising comprehensive intra- and inter-household insurance schemes. At 
the same token, the weakness of high-frequency co-movements in the relative wage and 
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consumption distributions strongly rejects the extreme alternative of no consumption smoothing 
(Attanasio and Davis 1996). Both public and private institutions clearly exist that offset 
consumption loss because of income loss. A more general approach to examining consumption 
insurance empirically admits partial consumption insurance, whose effectiveness may vary over 
time. 
How the Income Tax Creates Partial Consumption Insurance 
Consider the United States federal income tax system and the attendant reforms in the 
1980s. If the only tradeoff facing policymakers were between the equity effects of changing the 
income distribution and the efficiency effects of behavioral incentives, then the optimal income 
tax literature yields either a declining or zero marginal income tax on the highest income earner 
(Stiglitz 1987; Dahan and Strawczynski 2000) or in some cases a U-shaped marginal tax rate 
structure (Diamond 1998). However, if policymakers are also concerned about the variability of 
after-tax income and consumption, and some of the observed differences in income are due to 
exogenous differences in “luck,” then the marginal tax rate on the highest income earner might 
be quite large (Varian 1980; Strawczynski 1998). If redistribution and partial insurance are 
important policy objectives then a steeply progressive income tax system might on balance be 
welfare improving. 
In Table 1 we present the United States federal income tax rates for a married couple 
filing jointly for the years immediately before and after ERTA (1980 and 1982) and the years 
immediately before and after TRA86 (1985 and 1987). The pre-ERTA United States federal 
income tax system is targeted towards redistribution and partial insurance. In 1980 there were 16 
marginal tax rates, which increased by about 4 percentage points for each successive bracket 
above the zero bracket amount. At low levels of the taxable income distribution the tax brackets 
were quite narrow, creating a high probability of a tax-rate reduction in the event of an 
idiosyncratic income loss. As evidenced by the rate schedules for 1982 and 1985, ERTA did 
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little to the number and width of tax brackets. However, ERTA indexed the brackets for inflation 
by 1985 and reduced the marginal tax rates at all levels, especially for upper-income Americans. 
TRA86 slashed the number of statutory brackets to five in 1987 and to four in 1988 (the 33 
percent rate created a so-called bubble for some higher-income taxpayers before declining back 
to 28 percent). Under TRA86 the brackets were widened substantially, which reduces the 
probability of a marginal tax-rate reduction in the presence of income loss, although average tax 
burdens still decline within brackets. Changes to the United States federal income tax code in the 
1980s suggest a reduced concern about the automatic stabilizing component of the system 
relative to the deadweight loss of reduced incentives. Indeed, the 1982 and 1987 issues of the 
Economic Report of the President contain extensive discussion of the efficiency costs of high 
income tax rates but no mention of the possible efficiency benefits via consumption smoothing. 2  
An intuitive way to think about the partial-insurance capability of the federal income tax 
is through the curvature of the tax function. In Figure 1 we graph the statutory rates for 1980 and 
1987. It appears that the pre-ERTA system is more globally concave than the post-TRA86 rate 
structure; the rate of change in marginal tax rates is greater overall before ERTA than after 
TRA86. However, the 1987 structure appears more locally concave in certain regions, 
particularly in the 15 to 28 percent marginal tax brackets. If the bulk of taxpayers are located just 
above the 28 percent tax kink, then it is possible that automatic stabilization actually increased 
with TRA86. In 1995 about 60 percent of taxpayers were in the 15 percent bracket, and about 17 
percent were in the 28 percent bracket (Burman et al. 1998). Provided that the incomes of upper-
income Americans are relatively rigid downward, the likely outcome was a decrease in automatic 
stabilization with TRA86. 
Concurrent with reforms to the federal income tax were reforms to the Social Security 
payroll tax (FICA) in the early 1980s and to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) with TRA86. 
Because of concerns over the solvency of the Social Security program, Congress legislated an 
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aggressive program to increase both the FICA tax base and tax rates. During 1980–1987 the 
FICA tax base increased by 70 percent from $25,900 to $43,800, and the payroll tax rate 
increased by 17 percent from 6.13 to 7.15 percent. To counter the regressivity of the payroll tax 
and to stimulate work among low-income households Congress also expanded the EITC in 1986. 
The phase-in subsidy rate of the EITC increased from 10 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1987 
and the phase-out rate decreased from 12.5 percent to 10 percent. The declining phase-out tax 
rate resulted in a 54 percent increase in the cut-off income level for credit eligibility from 
$10,000 to $15,432. Overall, reforms to Social Security and the EITC offset to some extent the 
declines in federal marginal tax rates for low and moderate-income earners and likely restored 
the implicit automatic stabilization in the tax system. 
Econometric Framework Admitting Partial Insurance 
To estimate how the partial consumption insurance implicit in the United States income 
tax system evolved during the 1980s we amend the Euler equation for household consumption 
(6) to become 
 ln( / ) ln( ) ln( )h h h ht t t dt tc n C y∆ = α∆ +β∆ +∆ε , (7) 
where aggregate consumption, Ct, represents aggregate resource constraints at time t, and hdty  is 
the household’s time t disposable income, ( ) ( )h h h h h h hdt t t t t t ty y y E D C y≡ − Τ − − + . Total tax 
payments, T(·), are a function of taxable income defined as gross income less exemptions and 
deductions, and tax credits, C(·), are a function of gross income. With complete consumption 
insurance, any variable cross-sectionally uncorrelated with preference shocks should be zero 
given controls for aggregate resources, or that 0β = . Under partial insurance, changes in 
consumption will be a function of both aggregate and idiosyncratic resources ( 0)β ≠ . With 
partial insurance the elasticity of per capita consumption with respect to gross income is  
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ln( / )
(1 )
h h h
h ht t t
t th h
t dt
c n y
y
y y
∂
= β − τ
∂
,  
where htτ  is the household’s combined marginal tax rate from total tax payments T(·) and credits 
C (·).3 Stabilization emanates both through the marginal tax rate, htτ , and implicitly through 
average tax rates via changes in disposable income, hdty . 
 
Data 
 
 Our data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for interview years 
1980–1991. The survey has followed a core set of households since 1968 plus newly formed 
households as members of the original core have split off into new families. The PSID contains 
detailed information on income and household composition. Our sample spans the two major 
recent income tax reforms in the United States, which occurred in 1981 (ERTA) and 1986 
(TRA86), and our data are the best available to study how a less graduated income tax affected 
the automatic stabilization of consumption inherent in the United States progressive income tax.4 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel treating missing observations as exogenous events. 
By eliminating only a missing person year of data the time series for each household can be of 
different length within 1980–1991. To be included in the sample the household head must (1) be 
at least 25 in 1980 and no more than 64 in 1991, (2) be finished with schooling by 1980, (3) not 
be permanently disabled or institutionalized, and (4) have the same marital status for 1980–1991 
(so as to keep the same tax table, which facilitates understanding how taxpayers who income 
split with a spouse for tax purposes may be differentially affected by the tax reforms of the 
1980s). To reduce further the influence of household composition changes and possible outliers 
we follow the existing literature and delete person-years with more than a 300 percent increase 
or more than a 75 percent decrease in consumption. We also require per capita consumption and 
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disposable income to be no less than $1,000 in any year. Our selection criteria produce a sample 
of 1,298 households with 12,341 person years of consumption. 
Consumption 
The advantage of the PSID relative to repeated cross-section surveys such as the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is that the PSID follows the same households 
longitudinally, which makes it unnecessary to construct a time series on artificial households 
based on membership in demographic cohorts (Attanasio and Davis 1996). The disadvantage of 
the PSID is that it presents less ideal measures of consumption than the CEX. Previous studies 
using the PSID to test for complete consumption insurance examine Euler equations for food 
consumption expenditures (Altug and Miller 1990; Cochrane 1991; Hayashi, Altonji, and 
Kotlikoff 1996). For comparability we too estimate Euler equations for food expenditures. 
Because tests of the permanent income hypothesis are known to be sensitive to the consumption 
measure, we focus on a broader measure of consumption defined as the residual of income net of 
the change in predicted wealth and taxes paid (Ziliak 1998).  
To elaborate on the more comprehensive consumption measure we use, the PSID allows 
one to estimate household wealth ˆ( )htA , and, given wealth, construct personal saving as the year-
to-year change in wealth, 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
h h h
t t tS A A+= − . Total consumption then follows by subtracting saving 
from disposable personal income, ˆˆh h ht dt tc y S= − . The precision of total consumption as disposable 
income net of changes in wealth accumulation rests on how well we predict wealth ˆ( )htA . 
Using the PSID one can construct wealth alternatively as liquid assets (the capitalized 
value of rent, interest, and dividend income) or the sum of liquid assets and home equity (the 
difference between house value and mortgage principal). However, liquid assets and home equity 
miss changes in wealth holdings in the 1980s via Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). An 
alternative is to exploit information in the PSID wealth supplements. 
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In 1984 and 1989 the PSID conducted detailed wealth surveys for each household head, 
including questions on the amount of cash in checking and savings accounts, stock and bond 
holdings, vehicle equity, farm and non-farm business equity, equity in primary and secondary 
homes/real estate, and IRA contributions. Our strategy for predicting wealth is to estimate fixed-
effect wealth regressions as a function of liquid assets or liquid assets and home equity. 
Specifically, we pool the 1984 and 1989 wealth supplements for the 1298 household heads and 
permit a household-specific intercept along with a common coefficient each for liquid assets and 
home equity. 
Appendix Table A.1 displays the wealth regressions (with the person-specific intercepts 
suppressed). We examine both net worth and net non-housing non-business wealth as dependent 
variables. The accuracy of the wealth predictions as determined by the adjusted R2 improves 
markedly with net worth relative to the narrower wealth measure, but there is only a trivial 
increase in fit from 0.92 to 0.93 when including home equity as an additional covariate in the net 
worth prediction equations. 
Although Ziliak (1998) focuses on the broader wealth measure, most of the flow in 
saving emanates from liquid sources. It may also be tenuous to define consumption as involving 
unrealized capital gains in the housing stock.5 Lastly, due to the greater noise in home equity, 
when constructing consumption using net worth predicted from liquid assets and home equity 
there are an additional 2,000 person-years of data lost relative to net worth predicted from liquid 
assets alone. Hence, most of our tests rely on the narrower definition of consumption based on 
net worth predicted from liquid assets.6 
Our total consumption measure is advantageous compared to food expenditures because 
food is stabilized by the Food Stamp Program. The PSID also did not collect food consumption 
for the 1988 and 1989 interview years, which are two critical years after TRA86 needed to 
identify automatic stabilization effects. Our total consumption measure also improves on 
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predicted consumption for the PSID proposed by Skinner (1987) because the PSID stopped 
collecting many of the components used in Skinner’s measure prior to TRA86, and Skinner’s 
measure may be more susceptible to changes in the relative prices of goods compared to our 
measure (Attanasio and Weber 1995). 
A potential disadvantage of our consumption measure is that it implicitly includes 
durable goods, which introduces the difficulty of distinguishing between expenditures and 
service flows of consumption (Hayashi 1985). Hayashi includes durable consumption by 
modeling total consumption as a distributed lag of current and previous expenditures. Although 
we do not take the distributed lag approach for the evolution of consumption, we attempt to 
control for implied autocorrelation in our total consumption measure via our econometric 
estimator as described below. We also have reason to be concerned about potential measurement 
error in total consumption, which will lead us to adopt an instrumental variables estimator. 
Income and Taxes  
 The final data issue we need note concerns key independent variables in our estimating 
equation (7): gross family income and tax payments. Information is available to construct family 
income from labor and interest earnings and transfers received. Because transfer income such as 
unemployment insurance, food stamps, and AFDC is an important source of consumption 
insurance (Hamermesh 1982; Dynarski and Gruber 1997; Gruber 1996, 1997) we include 
government transfers as part of income when identifying the automatic stabilization properties of 
income taxes. 
With each wave until 1992 the PSID has used household income and estimates of 
deductions and exemptions to construct a household’s marginal tax rate and taxes paid. For 
exemptions, the PSID has recorded the number of dependents used for tax purposes. For 
deductions, they have used the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income to generate a 
typical value of itemized deductions for the household’s adjusted gross income. Taxable income 
 
13 
is then computed by subtracting positive values of excess itemized deductions (itemized 
deductions less the standard deduction) from gross income for tax years prior to 1987, or by 
subtracting the larger of itemized deductions and the standard deduction from gross income for 
tax years 1987 and beyond. Given taxable income, they then compute tax payments based on the 
statutory rates for each year. The PSID also computes an estimated value of the EITC for 
qualifying families so that tax payments can be negative. However, they omit both Social 
Security tax payments as well as state income tax payments. As in Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) 
we obtain an estimate of total taxes by adding to federal income taxes the estimated payroll tax 
payment for the head (and spouse when present) and the state income tax payment using the 
average income tax rate for the household’s state.7 
A possible concern is the quality of the tax data available in the PSID relative to the 
population tax-return information collected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Although a 
comprehensive comparison of the PSID tax data with the IRS tax data is beyond our scope, we 
can compare the IRS’s published 1980 average tax rates (Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, 1983) to average tax rates for 1980 from the PSID. Because the IRS data are from 
households of all types, we select a fresh cross-section sample of heads of households in the 
1980 PSID to make the PSID data maximally comparable to the IRS data. We report the average 
tax rates for adjusted gross income classes in Figure 2. The PSID tax data compare favorably to 
the IRS data at all income levels, with the possible exception of the very rich.  
 
Estimation Issues 
 
The complete implicit consumption insurance model in (6) can be estimated consistently 
using OLS (Cochrane 1991; Deaton 1997; Gertler and Gruber 1997; Mace 1991; Nelson 1994). 
Introducing household-specific disposable income to capture partial insurance makes estimating 
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the Euler equation in (7) more complicated econometrically. It is unreasonable to assume that 
( ) 0h hdt tE y∆ ∆ε =  because the composite error term contains the household-specific discount 
factor, lnρh, which is likely to covary with income over the life cycle. Another complexity we 
must confront in the econometric setup is that if disposable income is measured with error then it 
will covary contemporaneously with the error term in consumption. 
Latent Heterogeneity 
 Consider first the case where the evolution of gross income is not independent of the 
discount factor. Because the model in equation (7) is in first differences unobserved person-
specific time-invariant heterogeneity in consumption levels is swept away. Growth-rate 
heterogeneity may manifest itself in the household’s discount factor. One econometric approach 
that immediately comes to mind is to treat the discount factor as fixed and sweep it out with 
either the within or the first-difference transformation. Eliminating discount rate heterogeneity 
with the first-difference transformation exacerbates measurement errors-in-variables problems 
relative to the within transformation and results in the loss of another year of data (Griliches and 
Hausman 1986). Here the within transformation also makes predetermined variables invalid as 
instruments (Keane and Runkle 1992). Neither the simple first difference or within estimators are 
suitable for our purposes. 
The econometric approach we take builds on the correlated random-effects estimators of 
Mundlak (1978), who proposed using the individual’s means of the time-varying regressors as 
proxies for the fixed effect, and Chamberlain (1984), who proposed using the linear projection of 
the time-varying regressors as proxies for the fixed effect. We use a correlated random-effects 
approach similar to Mundlak (1978), but instead of using the individual’s means of the time-
varying regressors we follow more closely the method of Lawrence (1991), who estimates 
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discount rates as a function of pre-sample information. The equation for the discount factor we 
use is 
 ln ,h h hxρ = ϕ + ω    (8) 
where hx  is a vector of pre-sample variables and hω  is a mean-zero random error. Pre-sample 
information includes the household head’s education level, race, and five-year birth cohort, the 
latter of which are intended to capture cohort-specific differences in discount rates. Amended in 
light of (8), along with the parameterization of intertemporal preferences described in footnote 1, 
our estimating equation becomes  
 ln( / ) ln( ) ln( ) ,h h h h h ht t t dt t tc n C y d x∆ = α∆ +β∆ + ∆ γ + ϕ+∆ζ  (9) 
where ln .h h ht t∆ζ = ω + ∆ ν  
Measurement Error 
 Estimation of equation (9) is further complicated by possible measurement error in 
changes in disposable income. In the case of income changes there are two, possibly offsetting, 
sources of measurement error. First, there is classical attenuation bias in the coefficient toward 
zero due to incorrect measurement of the various income components and tax payments. Second, 
there may be a positive bias arising because the household’s income is used to construct the 
dependent variable, total consumption. It is impossible to determine a priori whether stochastic 
components of income make the regression coefficient of disposable income likely to be biased 
upward or downward, if at all. 
To estimate the parameters of equation (9) consistently we specify a vector of moment 
conditions, ( ) 0 ,h ht sE z s t∆ζ = ∀ ≥ which use an available set of predetermined instruments, 
h
tz , 
that are maintained to be orthogonal to the contemporaneous error term.8 One possible approach 
to estimating the moment conditions is two stage least squares (2SLS). Because the error term 
h
t∆ζ  contains both random time-invariant heterogeneity,
hω , and an MA(1) component, ln ht∆ ν , 
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serial correlation is likely problematic. As discussed previously, total consumption implicitly 
contains durable goods, which may also generate autocorrelation. Consequently, 2SLS will not 
be efficient. A tractable approach admitting general forms of serial correlation, due both to 
unobserved heterogeneity and to the moving average process in ht∆ζ , is Keane and Runkle’s 
(1992) forward-filter estimator.  
 The forward filter estimator, which still maintains orthogonality with the original set of 
predetermined instruments, has several steps. First, we estimate equation (9) by 2SLS and save 
the (T−2) vector of estimated residuals for each household, ˆ h∆ζ . We then compute a (T−2) × 
(T−2) matrix, 1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ( )h hC
H
−′= ∆ζ ∆ζ∑ , and filter it with an upper-triangular Cholesky 
decomposition. Last, we pre-multiply (9) by ˆ ˆ( )HQ I C= ⊗ and estimate the transformed forward-
filtered equation with the original set of instruments. Although Hansen’s (1982) Generalized 
Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimator is efficient, recent bootstrap Monte Carlo evidence is that 
the estimator we use has good finite-sample properties relative to 2SLS and GMM (Ziliak 1997). 
 
Empirical Results 
 
 We begin estimating (9) by specifying a base-case model where total household 
consumption is disposable income net of the change in net worth predicted by liquid assets. As 
time-varying demographics we include changes in the number of children in the household and 
changes in the age of the youngest child. Controlling for children implicitly introduces household 
economies to scale given that consumption is measured in per capita terms. In addition to a 
constant and the time-varying covariates the instrument set has values at time (t−1) of the head’s 
annual hours of work, age, number of children, real hourly wage, the state unemployment rate, 
and dummies for marital status, health status, spouse’s education, geographic region, industry, 
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occupation, union status, home ownership, and female headship and values at time (t−2) of real 
disposable income. As specification checks on instrument sets we test the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions with the Sargan test from the first-stage 2SLS regression.9 
Column (1) of Table 2 reports base-case estimates. The estimated coefficient on the 
change in log disposable income is highly statistically significant, which is consistent with the 
existing consumption-smoothing literature’s common rejection of the complete consumption 
insurance hypothesis. The base case estimate of β̂  indicates that absent an offset from income 
taxation a 10 percent decrease in gross family income would make total consumption fall by 
about 7.8 percent. When evaluated at the overall sample means, the post-tax effect of a 10 
percent reduction in gross income is a 6.6 percent reduction in consumption (0.775×(1−0.316) × 
(42,240/34,040)). On average, the progressive federal income tax in the 1980s stabilized 
consumption losses by about 15 percent, which is an under-appreciated benefit to households 
who experience idiosyncratic income losses.10  
Our base-case estimate of the impact of disposable income changes on total consumption 
changes of 0.78 is quite similar to the instrumental-variables estimate of 0.80 found in Attanasio 
and Davis’s (1996) test of complete insurance in which they regressed the husband’s wage on 
non-durable consumption from the CEX, and is also in line with Parker’s (1999) estimate of the 
impact of predictable changes in Social Security taxes on non-durable consumption in the CEX 
of 0.6. As another check on our base-case estimate we consider three alternative measures of per 
capita consumption in Table 2: total consumption defined as income net of changes in net non-
housing non-business wealth predicted by liquid assets, total consumption defined as income net 
of changes in net worth predicted by liquid assets and home equity, and food consumption. The 
estimated coefficients on disposable income move in the expected directions. By netting out a 
narrower definition of saving in column (2) we expect consumption to more closely track 
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income, and the estimate of 0.92 is consistent with our prior.11 Likewise, by netting out a broader 
definition of saving we expect a weaker link between consumption changes and income changes, 
which is confirmed by the point estimate of 0.68. Lastly, we expect the link between income 
changes and food consumption changes to be weaker still because food, once accounting for 
household scale economies, is likely to be a relatively fixed share of the budget. Food is also 
stabilized by the Food Stamp Program. Indeed, in food consumption regressions that do not 
control for children and age of youngest child, the coefficient of income change is about 0.27; 
once we control for household economies the estimate falls to 0.09 and is not statistically 
different from zero. Parker (1999) likewise finds the impact of Social Security tax changes on 
food consumption to be insignificant (0.133 with a standard error of 0.2). 
Automatic Stabilization After ERTA and TRA86 
 To gauge how the automatic stabilizing component of the income tax has changed 
because of ERTA and TRA86 we make some calculations of the effect of gross-income changes 
on consumption changes that can be attributed to income tax offsets, i.e., ( ) ( )ˆ 1 /h h ht t dty yβ − τ . In 
particular, using the benchmark no-tax impact of 0.775 from column (2) of Table 2 we infer at 
different points in the income distribution the percent reduction in total consumption per capita 
in response to gross-income cuts of 10 and 30 percent for each of the tax regimes in effect during 
the 1980s. We also evaluate the additional contribution to the automatic stabilization of 
consumption due to FICA and the EITC. 
Our reference households are a married couple filing jointly with two children and a 
female head of household with two children. To compare households situated similarly in the 
income distribution we consider married and female-headed households with the median, 50 
percent of the median, and 150 percent of the median United States gross incomes based on 
income distribution estimates from the Current Population Survey. We also examine a typical 
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married couple located in the top 5 percent of the income distribution to gauge how the tax 
system has stabilized consumption of the wealthy. 
Income Taxes in Isolation.   Because the income distribution is likely an endogenous 
function of the tax system, it is most informative to calculate consumption stabilization based on 
constant dollars rather than current dollars (Kasten et al. 1994). Table 3 presents our calculations 
for a 10 or 30 percent cut in gross income evaluated at constant 1985 dollars. The general pattern 
is an increase in the effect of gross-income changes on consumption changes, and thus a 
substantial decline in automatic stabilization of consumption associated with the 1980s tax 
reforms. For a married couple with the median income in 1980, a 10 percent cut in gross incomes 
led to a 6.6 percent cut in consumption, or a reduction of 15 percent from our no-tax case of 
about 7.75 percent. As of 1987 a 10 percent gross-income loss results in a 7.3 percent reduction 
in consumption, which is a reduction in stabilization of 60 percent from 1980.12 Although 
married couples at 50 percent of the median had little change in stabilization between the 1980 
and 1987 federal income tax regimes, married couples at 150 percent of the median and in the 
top 5 percent of the income distribution experienced reductions in stabilization of 35 and 28 
percent. A similar pattern of larger post-tax impacts of income changes on consumption changes 
(less stabilization) is also evident for 30 percent income cuts.  
For female-headed households at half the median income for their group, the tax system 
provides no consumption-smoothing benefits for income losses because they are outside the 
federal income tax system altogether. Alternatively, median income female-headed households 
experiencing 30 percent declines in income faced a 100 percent decline in consumption 
stabilization from 1980 to 1987. In 1980 a 30 percent gross-income cut led to a 20.5 percent cut 
in consumption, but by 1987 the same taxable income cut lowered their marginal tax rate from 
14 percent to zero producing in turn a 23.25 percent consumption loss. Although low-income 
single mothers have access to the transfer system for consumption stabilization, reductions in 
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both the generosity of real transfer payments and in access to programs after passage of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 makes consumption 
stabilization less in evidence.   
FICA and the EITC.     The bolded figures in Table 3 expand the definition of tax 
liability to include FICA taxes and the EITC. There are a few noticeable changes. For married 
couples at one-half the median income the impact of gross income losses on total consumption 
per capita falls by the late 1980s from 6.8 percent to 5.9 percent for 10 percent income cuts, and 
from 20.4 percent to 17.6 percent for 30 percent income cuts. EITC expansions as part of 
TRA86, coupled with the rising FICA base and rate, enhanced low-income households’ ability to 
mitigate drops in consumption. For small income shocks the extent of stabilization for median-
income households was little changed during the 1980s after inclusion of FICA and the EITC. 
This implies that a substantial proportion of the 60 percent reduction in stabilization from federal 
income tax reform was offset by FICA and the EITC, especially FICA because the EITC was 
insufficiently generous to impact median-income households. However, the pattern of reduced 
consumption stabilization for high-income married couples is unchanged by recent adjustments 
to FICA and the EITC. Importantly, female heads of households at 150 percent of the median, 
like low-income married households, experienced a reduced effect of income on consumption 
(greater stabilization) because of EITC and FICA expansions.  
Tax Reforms of the 1990s.     How much did the automatic stabilization of 
consumption change as a result of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993 
and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997? The tax reforms of the 1990s partially reversed the move 
toward fewer brackets begun with TRA86 in favor of a rate structure more like 1987’s. Instead 
of the four tax brackets in 1988, by 1998 there were five marginal tax rates: 15, 28, 31, 36, and 
39.6 percent. Significant expansions of the payroll tax base and rates continued during the 1990s; 
by 1998 the applicable base was $68,400 with a rate of 7.65 percent. More significant for low-
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income households was the substantial increase in the generosity of the EITC. From 1987 to 
1998 the phase-in rate increased from 14 to 40 percent, the maximum tax credit increased from 
$851 to $3,756, and the phase-out rate increased from 10 to 21 percent. The greater number of 
tax rates, the broader payroll tax base, and the higher EITC subsidy and phase-out rates should 
make automatic stabilization greater at the end of the 1990s than at the end of the 1980s. 
 To examine the possibility of increased stabilization of consumption by changes in 
income-related taxes during the 1990s we conduct an exercise analogous to the calculations in 
Table 3 by using our estimated consumption Euler equation with tax system data for 1998. When 
factoring in the combined impact of federal income taxes, FICA, and the EITC there are several 
instances of greatly increased automatic-consumption stabilization. A 30 percent income loss 
reduced consumption for a married couple with the median income by 21.2 percent in 1987; by 
1998 the corresponding consumption loss was 14.01 percent, or a nearly four-fold increase in 
stabilization. The reason for the substantial increase in consumption insurance is that the median 
income married couple now falls into the phase-out range of the EITC and faces a substantially 
higher marginal tax rate than ten years earlier. Similarly enlarged consumption stabilization 
during the 1990s appears for married couples at 50 percent of the median income and single 
mothers at 150 percent of the median income. Relatively high-income married couples also 
experienced increased consumption insurance against large income losses during the 1990s 
because of the expanded FICA base. Overall, there has been a restoration or expansion of 
collective consumption insurance in the federal income-related tax system during the 1990s 
driven largely by the increased generosity of the EITC. 
Sensitivity Checks 
 Our final econometric activity is to examine whether our central conclusion that the 
progressive federal income tax system provides collective insurance benefits to households 
depends on any obvious econometric detail. Table 4 presents the results of six sensitivity checks.  
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Aggregate Resources.     Equation (9), which we use to examine the impacts of 
income tax reforms on consumption stabilization, is similar econometrically to what researchers 
use to test the permanent income hypothesis (Hall and Mishkin 1982; Lusardi 1996; Runkle 
1991; Zeldes 1989; Ziliak 1998).13 If we replace aggregate consumption by the after-tax interest 
rate, and if the after-tax interest rate captures aggregate business cycle conditions, then a non-
zero coefficient on income changes indicates excess sensitivity. 
Chamberlain (1984) notes that tests of the permanent-income hypothesis are valid to the 
extent that the after-tax interest rate captures aggregate resources. Tests of partial insurance using 
equation (9) are likewise valid to the extent that Ct adequately tracks aggregate resources. As a 
check on the assumption that aggregate consumption tracks aggregate resources well we replace 
average consumption with time dummies in the second column of Table 4. The estimated effect 
of disposable income changes is 0.766, which is nearly identical to our base-case estimate of 
0.775. 
 Smooth Tax Function.     Our next robustness check is to replace the tax payments 
constructed by the PSID staff that we use in calculating disposable income with tax payments 
estimated from a tax function that is approximated by a smooth cubic polynomial in taxable 
income. A smooth tax function is an econometrically attractive alternative to the piece-wise 
linear approach to estimating tax effects on labor supply because by smoothing the tax kinks one 
lessens concerns over measurement error problems if households switch tax brackets when hours 
change (MaCurdy et al. 1990; Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). In the smooth income tax approach the 
payroll and average state income tax rates still apply, but the federal rate is a continuously 
differentiable function. When we use the smooth tax rate function in estimating the Euler 
equation for consumption the estimated amount of automatic stabilization is virtually unchanged. 
That the estimates based on a smooth tax function are in accord with estimates based on the 
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PSID’s tax rates lends further support that the taxes computed by the PSID are comparatively 
well measured. 
Additional Latent Heterogeneity.     If our correlated random-effects specification 
for the discount rate inadequately captures unobserved growth-rate heterogeneity then there may 
be additional latent heterogeneity in the Euler equation for consumption growth equation (9). For 
completeness we estimate the baseline specification in first-difference form (difference in 
consumption differences), which appears in column (4) of Table 4. Allowing for additional 
person-specific heterogeneity lowers the estimated marginal effect of disposable income on 
consumption by about 11 percent, such that β̂  falls from about 0.775 to about 0.688. Estimating 
the baseline correlated random effects model on the restricted first-difference sample of 8,570 
person-years yields a disposable income coefficient of 0.66, which suggests the lower coefficient 
from first-differencing is not from additional heterogeneity but from changes in the sample. We 
infer that our baseline correlated random effects specification captures time-invariant 
heterogeneity in the evolution of consumption reasonably well. 
 Asymmetric Responses.     We do multiple specification checks relaxing the 
assumption of a common coefficient on disposable income.14 The first test postulates that 
consumption may respond asymmetrically to positive as opposed to negative income shocks. To 
test the asymmetric response hypothesis we construct an indicator variable that is one if the 
income change is negative and interact it with the income change variable. We also append to 
our instrument set the interaction of income and the negative shock indicator at (t−2). Columns 
(5) and (6) of Table 4 contain consumption Euler equation estimates that permit an asymmetric 
response. Based on the coefficient of the interacted regressor, −0.0168 with a standard error of 
0.0473, we find no evidence that consumption responds asymmetrically to positive versus 
negative disposable income shocks. 
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Permanent/Transitory Income.     The permanent income hypothesis is that 
consumption responds to permanent changes in income but not to transitory changes so that the 
Euler equation error over time is expected to be zero. The consumption insurance hypothesis 
makes no explicit distinction between permanent and transitory income changes, and only 
implies that Euler-equation errors are expected to be equal across households and not necessarily 
equal to zero. In our context the tax code does not distinguish between permanent and transitory 
income shocks -  regardless of source the tax code automatically stabilizes income shocks. 
To test the neutrality of income changes proposition, we decompose income fluctuations 
into permanent and transitory shocks. Following Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995) we estimate a 
fixed-effect Mincer equation for income where the human-capital controls include a quadratic in 
the head’s age, education of the head, marital status of the head, and industry/occupation of the 
head. We then create permanent income as the fitted value of the human-capital income 
regression. Transitory income is then the deviation of observed current income from permanent 
income. We report the results of the forward-filter estimates of the impact of permanent and 
transitory income changes on total consumption per capita in columns (7) and (8) of Table 4. 
Although the coefficient on transitory income is less than the coefficient on permanent income, 
which is consistent with the permanent-income hypothesis, a Wald test does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the two income change coefficients are equal at the 0.37 level.15 
Income Heterogeneity.     In all specifications considered we have assumed that the 
impact of disposable income on consumption is homogeneous across the income distribution. It 
is conceivable that there is reduced access to formal and informal channels of insurance as one 
moves down the income distribution. A consequence would be that the consumption of low-
income households may be more responsive to disposable income changes than the consumption 
of high-income households. 
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In Table 4 we interact the change in disposable income with a four-part spline function 
based on average household income. Specifically, we compute average income by calculating the 
household-specific time mean of income, 
1
1
hT
h
dth
t
y
T =
∑ , and order average income from lowest to 
highest. We then split the distribution into four parts similar to Table 3 to create four dummy 
variables: income is (1) less than or equal to 50 percent of the median income (I1), (2) between 
50 and 150 percent of the median (I2), (3) between 150 percent of the median and the top 5 
percent (I3), and (4) in the top 5 percent of the distribution (I4). We also interact the income 
category spline function with the set of excluded instruments, substantially increasing the 
number of over-identifying restrictions. The results for a consumption Euler equation that 
incorporates income distribution effects appear in the last four columns of Table 4. Although 
there is a qualitative difference in the responsiveness of consumption to income changes across 
the income distribution, a Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal responsiveness 
(p-value = 0.89), which lends further support for our base-case specification in column (2) of 
Table 2. 
Welfare Costs of Reduced Stabilization 
 Finally we address the broader issue of the welfare costs of reduced consumption 
stabilization due to tax reform. Parameter estimates in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that for the median 
household the federal tax reforms of the 1980s reduced automatic stabilization of consumption 
by about one half. Adding in expansions in the EITC and the payroll tax the median household 
had little change in stabilization, low-income households had an increase in stabilization, and 
high-income households had a decrease in stabilization. The heterogeneity of results across the 
income distribution suggests that there were welfare gains and losses from the 1980s reforms. 
Using both the base-case parameters from Table 2 and the heterogeneous income parameters 
from Table 4 we document the net effect of changes on household welfare. 
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 We calculate the welfare cost of tax reform as the proportional increase in consumption 
necessary to leave the household equally well off when moving from a more progressive tax 
regime to a less progressive tax regime (from a system offering more consumption insurance to 
one offering less consumption insurance). Based on the social welfare function in equation (1), 
the isoelastic preferences in equation (5), and the corresponding estimated parameters in Tables 2 
or 4 for the consumption equation (9), we solve  
 1 10 1
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1 ) ( / ) ( ) (1 ) ( / )
H T H T
h h t h h h h h h t h h h h
t t t t t t t t
h t h t
n c n n c n−σ −σ
= = = =
κ µ ρ − σ θ = µ ρ − σ θ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (10) 
for κ  given estimated pre-reform per capita consumption 0̂( / )
h h
t tc n , post-reform per capita 
consumption 1̂( / )
h h
t tc n , alternative values of risk aversion (σ ), and household-specific weights 
( hµ ).16 For simplicity we assume that only one state is realized at time t, and we assume a 
utilitarian social welfare function giving equal weight to each household.17 Equation (9) is in 
terms of consumption growth, and we need consumption levels to construct the utility function in 
equation (10). We therefore calculate the household-specific consumption intercepts using the 
estimated consumption parameters and time-means of the variables, 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ( / )h h h h h hdc n C y d xψ = − α −β − γ − ϕ
) , and then add back hψ)  to obtain predicted per capita 
consumption. Predicted consumption per capita varies across the reforms because disposable 
income, ˆ hdty , changes with tax regimes, ceteris paribus. 
 To focus on mean-preserving increases in risk, all the reforms we consider are revenue 
neutral. Reforms also incorporate FICA and EITC tax payments and credits. The reforms we 
evaluate include moving from the 1980 tax structure for all years to (1) an equal-yield annual 
lump-sum tax, (2) an equal-yield proportional tax, (3) an equal-yield 1987 tax regime, and (4) an 
equal-yield 1987 tax rate but 1980 tax base regime. Because a proportional tax also provides 
consumption stabilization the comparison between the 1980 regime and the proportional tax 
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reveals the additional stabilization from progressivity. Likewise, distinguishing changes in the 
base from the rates in 1987 sheds light on the combined effects of base-broadening and 
indexation from TRA86. Lastly, for comparative purposes, we also calculate a fifth reform that 
moves the household from the 1987 tax regime to an equal yield annual lump sum tax and a sixth 
reform that moves the household from a tax regime that has the 1987 rates but the 1980 tax base 
to an equal-yield annual lump-sum tax. 
We calculate two broad sets of results in Tables 5 and 6, one based on actual data and the 
other based on simulated data. For the actual data we take the 12-year time series of income, 
deductions, demographics, and family structure for each household in the sample and construct 
disposable income under the various tax regimes. Given disposable income it is possible to 
construct predicted consumption per capita, which we then use to solve for κ  in equation (10) at 
various levels of risk aversion. The simulated data differ from the actual data in the construction 
of gross and net income. For each household we computed the 12-year time mean of income and 
then constructed current income as a multiplicative shock of permanent (average) income. In 
each period the household realizes one state of nature and faces shocks from two sources, a 
common macroeconomic shock and an idiosyncratic shock. The macro shock is parameterized to 
the growth in actual aggregate income in the sample for each period, and the idiosyncratic shock 
is a random normal variable that is distributed with mean one and standard deviation of either 10 
or 30 percent. To reduce the noise from any one simulated outcome we report the mean value of 
κ  across 100 iterations. Table 5 presents estimated welfare costs for alternative tax reforms 
based on the estimated consumption parameters in column (2) of Table 2, and Table 6 is based 
on the estimated consumption parameters from the last four columns of Table 4. Although the 
Wald test could not reject the null of a common income coefficient across the income 
distribution, we believe that the qualitative differences are significant enough to warrant separate 
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welfare calculations. Because our estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is near 2 
(1/0.42), we focus our discussion primarily on the center column of each table. 
In Table 5 the actual data indicate households would have to be compensated about 2.5 
percent of baseline per capita consumption to accept a move from the 1980 progressive tax 
regime to an economically equivalent annual lump-sum tax. Given total consumption per capita 
of $11,500, the implied compensation (welfare loss) is about $288 per capita annually. The 
comparable estimate for a risk aversion parameter of 3 is 7.2 percent, or about $828 of baseline 
per capita consumption. As anticipated ex ante, households also value the extra consumption 
insurance offered by a progressive tax system over a proportional tax system, as they would have 
to be compensated by about 1.5 percent of consumption to accept the proportional tax instead of 
the 1980 tax regime, with compensation increasing rapidly in risk aversion. Interestingly, in the 
actual data there appears to be very little welfare loss from TRA86, either for changes in the rates 
and base or changes in the base alone.18 The scant welfare impact of TRA86 based on insurance 
considerations appears to be due largely to the offsetting welfare gains and losses brought about 
from coincident reforms to FICA and the EITC.19 Although the magnitudes are slightly lower in 
the heterogeneous income coefficient case in Table 6 the welfare loss pattern from actual data is 
quite similar to the constant income coefficient case displayed in Table 5. 
When the idiosyncratic income shock is small (10 percent) in the simulated data the 
welfare losses are inconsequential across all the tax reforms. Similar to the case of log utility 
( 1σ = ) with the actual data, the household is behaving like a risk-neutral agent with small 
shocks to income. When the shock is sizable, on the order of 30 percent, the welfare losses get 
quite large, especially with high degrees of risk aversion. To accept an economically equivalent 
annual lump-sum tax versus the 1980 tax regime the household’s baseline consumption would 
have to be increased by upwards of 28 percent. An interesting result, which is consistent with 
Pechman (1985) who found the pre-ERTA tax system (federal + FICA + state) to be nearly 
 
29 
proportional, is the small (1 percent) welfare loss by moving from the 1980 system for all years 
to an equal yield proportional tax. The near equivalency of the 1980 system and a flat tax is 
attributable to the fact that in the simulated data there is no distinction between taxable and 
nontaxable income; all simulated income data are taken as labor income and subject to FICA 
whereas many households have income that is not subject to FICA. Lastly, we find that the cost 
of changing the tax system from ERTA to TRA86 is upwards of 6 percent for relatively risk 
averse households facing large income risk, but the welfare costs of consumption destabilization 
associated with the 1980s tax reforms are much more modest for the typical household. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 We specify a model of partial implicit consumption insurance with disposable income as 
the focal regressor. Our data are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for interview years 
1980–1991, and our measure of consumption is income net of taxes and liquid saving. The 
econometric model treats person-specific discount rates as a correlated random effect. To control 
for possible endogenous explanatory variables and serial correlation we use a forward-filter 
estimator. The goal of our research is to identify the degree to which the automatic stabilization 
of consumption has changed because of ERTA and TRA86. 
On average, the progressive income tax system stabilizes consumption by about 15 
percent in the face of idiosyncratic shocks to income. In some cases tax reforms of the 1980s 
actually increased the automatic stabilization inherent in a progressive income tax, but the typical 
outcome is that ERTA and TRA86 reduced total consumption stability by about 50 percent. 
More recent tax reforms, most notably expanded FICA coverage and increased EITC generosity, 
have restored or enhanced consumption insurance for certain economic groups, single mothers 
and low income married couples. 
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Our results highlight an under-appreciated benefit to households implicit in a progressive 
income tax. Undoubtedly the deadweight loss from reduced incentives declined for many 
taxpayers with the 1980s tax reforms. However, our simulations indicate that there was also a 
welfare loss from the reduction in collective insurance. An important topic for future research is 
to evaluate the offsetting welfare gains and losses from static versus dynamic efficiency effects 
of changes in the structure of personal income-based taxes with an eye toward more 
comprehensive optimal tax research. 
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1. Our empirical model will parameterize intertemporal preferences as 
( ){ }exp lnh h ht t td vθ = σ γ + , where htd  is a 1×k vector of observed time-varying 
demographics and ln htv  is a mean-zero random shock. 
 
2. Also important is the impact of tax reforms on the taxable income base. TRA86 had 
several base-broadening measures, which may or may not increase stabilization relative 
to the pre-TRA86 system depending on whether newly taxed income components are 
relatively volatile. We attempt to isolate changes in the rates versus the base in some of 
our welfare simulations below. 
 
3. Note that when gross income changes there is both a direct effect on per capita 
consumption via β  and an indirect effect via the tax system,  
  
1
1 *
h
t
h h h
t t dt
CT
y y y
   ∂∂
β − +   ∂ ∂   
. 
Because equation (7) is in double-log form the partial derivative with respect to gross 
income is  
 ( ) ( )
/
ln / / /
/
h h
t th h h h
t t t th h
t t
c n
c n y y
c n
∂
∂ ∂ = ∂ . 
To keep the formula in terms of an elasticity it is necessary to multiply both sides by 
gross income, hty . 
 
4. A practical reason for our sample dates is that in 1980 the PSID converted from hand-
calculated income tax information to computer-generated data, reducing measurement 
error considerably. In 1992 the PSID ceased collecting tax data, making 1991 the last 
year tax information is available. 
 
5. For an econometric examination of changes in home equity and saving see Engelhardt 
(1996). 
 
6. Our measure of net worth might be understated because of omitted pensions. The lack of 
pension wealth data in the PSID should not be problematic for our purposes. During the 
1980s over 60 percent of workers are not covered by private pensions (Statistical 
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Abstract of the United States 1998). Moreover, the majority of pension plan participants 
(over 60 percent in 1980, for example) are in defined benefit plans, which are highly 
illiquid because defined benefit pensions rarely offer the opportunity for borrowing 
against them for current consumption. Gale (1998) provides a critical survey of empirical 
estimates of the impact of pensions on overall saving and finds that after correcting for 
common econometric biases pensions may offset other forms of saving upwards of 70 
percent. Engen and Gale (2000) examine the impact of 401(k) plans on household wealth. 
Except for low-earnings households, 401(k)s seem to offer little net additions to wealth. 
 
7. The average state tax rate in the marginal tax rate is best viewed as a proportional tax 
over and above the federal marginal tax rate and is an additional source of consumption 
stabilization. 
 
8. Following Hayashi et al. (1996), we balance the unbalanced data by setting to zero 
incalculable changes in consumption across years resulting from missing person years. 
The procedure guarantees positive semi-definiteness of the fourth moments and ensures 
that the expectation of the moment condition is zero. 
 
9. Selected summary statistics for regression variables appear in Appendix Table A.2. We 
deflated food consumption by the food component of the CPI and deflated total 
consumption and income by the personal consumption expenditure deflator (base 1987). 
 
10. In addition to the Sargan test, a specification check on the results in column (1) is the 
pseudo likelihood ratio test of Eichenbaum et al. (1988), which can be used to examine 
the exogeneity of instruments: the household head’s hours of work at time t−1 and the 
household’s disposable income at time t−2 in particular. Disposable income at t−2 may 
fail exogeneity if there is sluggish adjustment of consumption changes to past income. 
Hours of work may fail exogeneity if consumption and leisure are not separable in utility, 
although by including gross income we are implicitly allowing non-separability between 
consumption and leisure. The data do not reject the null of instrument exogeneity. As a 
final check of our base specification’s instrument quality we estimated the first-stage 
model of the change in disposable income on our instrument set, which yields a first-
stage F-test of instrument relevance of 7.03 with a p-value less than 0.0000, indicating 
that our instruments are of good quality. 
 
11. We have also constructed total consumption similarly to that used in column (2) except 
that instead of predicted wealth we constructed wealth by capitalizing rent, interest, and 
dividend income. The resulting point estimate was 0.91. We also constructed saving by 
permitting asset revaluations between years, with the interest rate a weighted average of 
equity and bond yields. There was little difference in the point estimates. 
 
12. In 1980 the household moved from the 28 to the 24 percent marginal tax bracket. In 1987 
the household remains in the 15 percent bracket after the income cut. 
 
13. It is possible to have complete consumption insurance and yet violate the permanent 
income hypothesis, or vice versa, however (Cochrane 1991). 
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14. In an additional check not tabulated we consider the Lucas Critique, which suggests that 
the impact of disposable income may itself vary with the tax regime. We tested the 
possibility of policy induced parameter change by permitting the estimated disposable 
income coefficient to differ pre- and post-TRA86. The income coefficient is slightly 
more positive (consumption slightly less smooth) but never significantly so post TRA86. 
 
15. Note that it is possible to estimate the model by OLS if we assume that permanent and 
transitory income are correctly measured. OLS yields coefficients of 0.840 (0.068) and 
0.783 (0.015) for permanent and transitory income. The Wald test again does not reject 
the null of equality at the 0.39 level. 
 
16. The calculation is similar to how Attanasio and Davis (1996) examine the welfare cost of 
complete insurance. 
 
17. The standard model of consumption insurance postulates that the household weight is a 
positive function of the consumption endowment. In results not reported we used 
estimated household fixed effects as the weight with little change in the results. 
 
18. As a check on the insurance implicitly provided by bracket creep we computed welfare 
under the 1987 base and rate regime (σ = 2) versus an equal yield annual lump sum tax 
leaving the brackets unindexed for inflation. The welfare cost rises from the 1.43 percent 
annually in Table 5 to 1.80 percent annually.  
 
19. The welfare loss is increased by about a third (to 0.27 percent from the 0.21 percent in 
Table 5) when we partial out the effect of the changes in the federal income tax rates only 
pre-ERTA to post-TRA86. 
 
  
Table 1.    Tax Rate Schedules for Married Taxpayers 
in Selected Tax Yearsa 
  
Taxable Income 
(thousands of 
dollars) 
Marginal Tax 
Rate  
(percents) 
 Taxable Income 
(thousands of 
dollars) 
Marginal Tax 
Rate  
(percents) 
1980  1982 
3.4 or less 0  3.4 or less 0 
3.4–5.5 14  3.4–5.5 12 
5.5–7.6 16  5.5–7.6 14 
7.6–11.9 18  7.6–11.9 16 
11.9–16.0 21  11.9–16.0 19 
16.0–20.2 24  16.0–20.2 22 
20.2–24.6 28  20.2–24.6 25 
24.6–29.9 32  24.6–29.9 29 
29.9–35.2 37  29.9–35.2 33 
35.2–45.8 43  35.2–45.8 39 
45.8–60.0 49  45.8–60.0 44 
60.0–85.6 54  60.0–85.6 49 
85.6–109.4 59  85.6–109.4 50 
109.4–162.4 64  109.4–162.4 50 
162.4–215.4 68  162.4–215.4 50 
215.4+ 70  215.4+ 50 
     
     
1985  1987 
3.54 or less 0  3.0 or less 11 
3.54–5.72 11  3.0–28.0 15 
5.72–7.91 12  28.0–45.0 28 
7.91–12.39 14  45.0–90.0 35 
12.39–16.65 16  90.0+    38.5 
16.65–21.02 18    
21.02–25.6 22    
25.6–31.12 25    
31.12–36.63 28    
36.63–47.67 33    
47.67–62.45 38    
62.45–89.09 42    
89.09–113.86 45    
113.86–169.02 49    
169.02+ 50    
     aTaxable income for tax years prior to 1987 is typically defined as adjusted gross income less 
exemptions and excess itemized deductions (the excess of itemized deductions over the zero bracket 
amount). For 1987 and beyond taxable income is defined as adjusted gross income less exemptions and the 
larger of itemized deductions or the standard deduction. 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2.    Forward-Filter Estimates of the Impact of Disposable Income  
on ∆ln (Consumption Per Capita) a 
 
Base Case b Alternative Consumption Measures  c  
C0 C1
 C2 C3 
∆ln(Sample Consumption) 
 
0.4165 
(0.0764) 
 
0.3502 
(0.0819) 
0.4348 
(0.1418) 
0.4988     
(0.1496) 
∆ln(Disposable Income) 
 
0.7752 
(0.0963) 
0.9253     
(0.0909) 
0.6773 
(0.1423) 
0.0869     
(0.0768) 
 
Sargan Testd 
. 
33.4146 
[35, 0.545] 
 
27.8353         
[35, 0.800]    
49.3175         
[35, 0.055] 
42.0248        
[35, 0.193] 
Number of Observations 10,360 10,894 8,308 9,874 
     aHeteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Each specification 
controls for changes in the number of children, changes in the age of the youngest child, and dummy 
variables for race, education, and five-year birth cohort. The instrument set includes a constant, (t−1) 
values of head’s annual hours of work, age of head, the number of children, the head’s real hourly wage, 
state unemployment rate, dummies for marital status, health status, spouse’s education, geographic region, 
industry, occupation, union status, female head, and home ownership, along with (t−2) values of real 
disposable income.  
     bBase total consumption is defined as disposable income less saving, where saving is the first difference 
of net worth predicted by liquid assets. 
     cTotal consumption denoted as C1 is defined as disposable income less saving, where saving is the first 
difference of net  non-housing non-business wealth predicted by liquid assets. Total consumption denoted 
as C2 is defined as disposable income less saving, where saving is the first difference of net worth 
predicted by liquid assets and home equity. Total consumption denoted as C3 is defined as food 
expenditures at home and away from home. 
     dThe Sargan Test is for the validity of the over identifying restrictions in the first-stage IV model. The 
degrees of freedom and p-values are given in square brackets. 
  
  
 
 
 
Table 3.    Percent Reduction in Total Consumption Per Capita in Response to Gross  
Income Cuts of 10 and 30 Percent for Alternative Tax Years and Filing Status  
(inclusive of FICA and the Earned Income Tax Credit)a 
 
 Married Couple with Two Children  Female Head with Two Children 
Year 
50 Percent of 
Median Median 
150 
Percent of 
Median 
Top 5 
Percent  
50 Percent 
of Median Median 
150 
Percent of 
Median 
 10 Percent Cut in Gross Income 
(1985 dollars) 
1980 6.89 
(6.83) 
6.62 
(7.09) 
5.72 
(6.00) 
5.62 
(5.84) 
 7.75 
(7.75) 
6.84 
(5.66) 
6.67 
(6.59) 
 
1982 6.93 
(6.87) 
6.69 
(6.61) 
5.82 
(6.25) 
5.87 
(6.18) 
 7.75 
(7.75) 
7.00 
(5.71) 
6.79 
(6.72) 
 
1985 7.09 
(7.03) 
6.87 
(6.79) 
6.28 
(6.80) 
6.28 
(6.65) 
 7.75 
(7.75) 
7.14 
(5.85) 
6.98 
(6.92) 
 
1987 6.82 
(5.88) 
7.26 
(7.21) 
6.42 
(6.97) 
6.22 
(6.60) 
 7.75 
(7.75) 
7.00 
(5.71) 
6.98 
(5.98) 
  
 30 Percent Cut in Gross Income 
(1985 dollars) 
1980 20.55 
(20.37) 
20.22 
(19.98) 
19.29 
(18.63) 
17.55 
(18.39) 
 23.25 
(23.25) 
20.46 
(16.32) 
20.88 
(20.70) 
 
1982 20.70 
(20.52) 
20.22 
(19.98) 
18.36 
(17.94) 
18.03 
(19.23) 
 23.25 
(23.25) 
20.97 
(16.44) 
20.82 
(17.28) 
 
1985 21.27 
 (21.12) 
21.09 
(20.91) 
20.25 
(19.98) 
19.35 
(20.76) 
 23.25 
(23.25) 
21.21 
(16.65) 
21.21 
(17.67) 
 
1987 20.85 
(17.61) 
21.36 
 (21.21) 
21.96 
 (21.87) 
19.68 
(21.15) 
 23.25 
 (23.25) 
23.25 
(18.57) 
20.37 
(16.83) 
     aBased on the estimate of β̂  from column (2), Table 2, the numbers in the table reflect the impact of gross 
income changes on total consumption changes after a 10 (30) percent income loss, ˆ (1 )( / )y yt t dtβ − τ .  In the 
absence of income taxes the consumption effect is ˆ *(100%)β  and ˆ *(300%)β , or 7.75 percent and 23.25 
percent.  Each representative filing unit is assumed to take the standard deduction and personal exemptions in 
calculating taxable income. 
 
  
 
Table 4.    Sensitivity of the Effect of Disposable Income Changes on 
Log Per Capita Total Consumption Changesa 
 
 ln∆ (Disposable Income) Sargan Testb 
Time Dummiesb 0.7663 
(0.0985) 
 
32.6673 
[35, 0.58] 
Smoth MTRc 0.8005 
(0.0964) 
 
32.5554 
[35, 0.59] 
First Differenced 0.6884 
(0.1499) 
 
20.0116 
[35, 0.98] 
Assymmetric Responsese   
     ln( )y∆  0.7906 
(0.0306) 
 
     ln( ) ( ln 0)*y I∆ ∆ <  0.0168 
(0.0473) 
 
33.8156 
[35, 0.53] 
Permanent/Transitory f   
     ln( )Py∆  
0.8273 
(0.1046) 
 
     ln( )Ty∆  
0.7246 
(0.0461) 
 
35.4120 
[35, 0.45] 
Heterogeneous Responsesb   
     ln( ) ( 0.5Med)*y I y∆ <  0.8124 
(0.1689) 
 
     ln( ) (0.5 1.5Med)*y I y∆ < <  0.7030 
(0.1079) 
 
     ln( ) (0.5 Top5)*y I y∆ < <  0.6080 
(0.1709) 
 
     ln( ) ( Top 5 )*y I y∆ ≥  0.6765 
(0.1688) 
108.3599 
[136, 0.96] 
     aHeteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are given in  parentheses. Base case 
estimate is 0.7752 (0.0963). 
     bTime dummies are used as covariates in place of the sample average of consumption, NT = 10,360. 
     cThe marginal tax rate is approximated by smooth, cubic polynomial in taxable income, NT = 10,351. 
     dModel in equation (7) is estimated in first differences. NT = 8,570. 
     eModel permits differences in income coefficients for positive versus negative changes. NT = 10,360. 
     fModel permits differences in income coefficients for permanent versus transitory income changes, 
where permanent income is predicted income from a fixed-effect human capital earnings equation and 
transitory income is the current period deviation from predicted income. NT = 10,360. 
     gModel permits differences in income coefficients for 12-year mean income less than one-half the 
median, between one-half and one-and-one-half the median, between one and a half the median and the top 
5, and those in the top 5 of the distribution. NT = 10,360.  
     hThe Sargan Test is for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions in first-stage IV. The degrees of 
freedom and p-values are given in square brackets.  
See notes to Table 3 for additional details. 
  
 
 
Table 5.    Welfare Costs of Alternative Tax Regimes—Common Income Coefficient Modela 
(in percent) 
 
Actual Data Simulated Data 
Common and 10 Percent 
Idiosyncratic Income Shock 
Common and 30 Percent 
Idiosyncratic Income Shock 
Percent Increase in Consumption to 
Compensate for Move  
Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion Equal to: 
Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion to: 
Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion Equal to: 
From: To: (1) (2)b (3) (1) (2)b (3) (1) (2)b (3) 
1980 Regime Equal Yield Lump Sum 0.30 2.46 7.19 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.29 7.10 27.79 
1980 Regime Equal Yield Proportional Tax 0.02 1.49 5.89 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.94 0.82 
1980 Equal Yield  
    Proportional Tax 
Equal Yield Lump Sum 0.28 1.00 0.21 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.28 6.43 26.33 
1987 Regime Equal Yield Lump Sum 0.24 1.43 0.30 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.23 5.72 21.34 
1987 Rate Regime Equal Yield Lump Sum 0.21 1.84 1.20 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.22 5.79 25.89 
1980 Regime Equal Yield 1987 Regime 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.82 5.91 
1980 Regime Equal Yield 1987 Rate Regime 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.73 8.79 
       aThe estimated income coefficients for the consumption function come from column (2) of Table 2.  
     bA coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2 is most consistent with the implied estimate from the data.  
 
  
 
 
Table 6.    Welfare Costs of Alternative Tax Regimes—Heterogeneous Income Coefficient Modela 
(in percent) 
 
Actual Data Simulated Data 
Common and 10 Percent 
Idiosyncratic Income Shock 
Common and 30 Percent 
Idiosyncratic Income Shock 
Percent Increase in Consumption to 
Compensate for Move  
Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion Equal to: 
Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion to: 
Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion Equal to: 
From: To: (1) (2)b (3) (1) (2)b (3) (1) (2)b (3) 
1980 Regime Equal Yield Lump Sum 0.26 1.89 1.53 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.27 5.67 22.76 
1980 Regime Equal Yield Proportional Tax 0.01 1.21 3.16 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.76 0.34 
1980 Equal Yield  
    Proportional Tax 
Equal Yield Lump Sum 0.25 0.70 0.38 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.26 5.11 21.61 
1987 Regime Equal Yield Lump Sum 0.20 1.19 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.23 4.23 12.80 
1987 Rate Regime Equal Yield Lump Sum 0.18 1.49 0.60 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.21 4.50 16.88 
1980 Regime Equal Yield 1987 Regime 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.64 3.09 
1980 Regime Equal Yield 1987 Rate Regime 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.47 5.12 
     aThe estimated income coefficients for the consumption function come from columns (9)–(12) of Table 4. 
     bCoefficient of relative risk aversion of 2 is most consistent with the implied estimate from the data.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Statutory Federal Marginal Tax Rates for Married Couples Filing Jointly
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Figure 2: Average Tax Rates for 1980 IRS and PSID Tax Returns by Adjusted Gross Income
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Appendix Table A.1.    Fixed Effect Wealth Prediction Equations Based on  
1984 and 1989 PSID Wealth Supplements 
 
 Net Non-Housing 
Non-Business Wealth Net Worth Net Worth 
Liquid Assets 1.1379 
(0.0260) 
 
1.6788 
(0.0302) 
1.6037 
(0.0286 
Home Equity   1.4777 
(0.1048 
 
Adjusted R2 0.84772 
 
0.9263 0.9361 
Number of Observations 2,596 2,596 2,596 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A.2.     Selected Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Sample Mean Standard Deviation 
∆ln(Base Total Consumption Per Capita) 0.004 0.380 
∆ln(Food Consumption Per Capita) 0.007 0.340 
∆ln(Disposable Income) 0.012 0.246 
Marginal Tax Rate 0.316 0.099 
Gross Income ($10,000s) 4.224 3.293 
Disposable Income ($10,000s) 3.404 2.459 
Number of Children 1.359 1.259 
Age of Youngest Child 5.365 5.550 
White 0.677 0.468 
Less than High School 0.224 0.417 
High School 0.369 0.483 
More than High School 0.406 0.491 
Birth Cohort 1 0.282 0.450 
Birth Cohort 2 0.273 0.446 
Birth Cohort 3 0.163 0.370 
Birth Cohort 4 0.133 0.339 
Birth Cohort 5 0.149 0.356 
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